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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah

ESTHER 0. KELLOGG,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
YS.

CALIFORNIA WESTERN STATES
LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY,
a corporation,
Defendant and Respondent.

CASE NO.
7159

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF FACTS
This is an appeal in a proceeding by Esther 0. Kellogg, widow of X eal.J. Kellogg, deceased, tried before the
Court without a jury, for the purpose of recovering the
double indemnity benefits under the defendant's $2000.00
insurance policy issued at Salt Lake City, U~tah by the
respondent, number 520903. It is her position that
the death was effected by ''accidental means'' within
the terms of the policy :and as such phrase has been
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

interpreted by the Utah Supreme Court.
Respondent insurance company admits the existence
of the policy, that it was in full force and effect and
that all necessary premiums have been duly paid for the
additional benefits in the event of accidental death.
However, they have arbitrarily refused to pay to the
widow the stipulated benefits due to her by reason of
Mr. Kellogg's accidental death.
Mr. Kellogg, the insured, in Oetober of 1946, underwent an unhurried surgical operation at Missoula, Montana for the reduction and repair of a post-operative
ventral hernia, which developed from a 1944 operation.
This was not an emergency operation. Dr. W. N.
McPhail, the operating surgeon with twenty years of
experience, testified as to the careful preliminary preparations and examinations as follows:
(P. 5 of deposition). "He was completely
examined to ascertain if hif' physical conditioH
was safe for an ope~ation of that nature, which
you could anticipate was going 1o be a long,
tedious operation, and he was found to he phy:-ically fit for such an undertaking. This examination was Yery completP, including- blood
tests, x-rays, metabolism test. I stated, I believe,
that he was found in fit condition for that operation. Then I operated on him October 12th.''
Dr. McPhail described the incision made and the
course of the operation after referring to the adhesions
found arising from the earlier operation and the timP
required to complete the surgical repair, 11:00 A.:M.
to 5:00 P.M. (p. 6 and 7 of deposition). Then he
testified:
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· •Q. \\'as this operation performed by you in
the customary manner for this type of surgieal repair work 1
~-\. It was.
Q. \Vas it completed without mishap~
~-\.
Yes.
Q. \Vas there anything that intervened from the
time of the first cutting of the incision to
the completion of the last sewing of the
opening, that was unusual or out of the ordinary w·ay o?
~-\. ~ o. Xothing beyond the unusually difficult
adhesions to seper.a te. There was nothing
in the man's general condition such as signs
of shock, or anything of that nature.
Q. \Vhat was his immediate condition following
the operation~
~-\. His condition was good immediately following the operation.''
His testimony was that Mr. Kellogg left the operatIng room at 5:00 P.:M. October 12th at which time his
condition "-was good" but that the next day he developed
Rhock and notwithstanding the application of customary
treatments he expired at 1 :05 P.M. on October 13th from
post-operative surgical shock. He testified on this phase:
(p. 9 of deposition)
'' Q.
ould you say tha't this post-operative surgical shock was the can~e of his death?
A. Yes, I would say so.
Q. Tell me whether or not this type of death is
the expected and natural consequence of the
operation that you performed?
..:-\. You may get surgical shock from any surgical operation. I~t doesn't of necessity have
to be even a large or a long operation. We
feel th'at we rna~- he unlueky enough to get

"T

3
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surgical shock any time we operate. But W<'
ordinarily do not expect to gHt surgical shock
following an operation. The more extensive
the operation is, and the greater length of
time that it takes, of course the more likelihood of shock there is. I did not PTZJPct to
get su.rgical shock when I operated on the
man, of cou.rse, but we allcays keep it in
mind. We may get it. It is not an ordinary
or necessary consequence of such an operation.''
Exhibit "B ", the death certificate made out by
Dr. McPhail prior to any thought of litigation, shows
the immediate cause of death as ''Post-operative surgical shock". It states ~the contributing causes as being
due to post-operative hernia repair which in turn was
due to a prior perforated duondenal ulcer.
Dr. Clark Young was ~ailed as a witness for the
plaintiff and in part he testified after a review of thP.
facts in a prior hypothetical question :
(Tr. 34)
"Q. Doctor, based upon knowledge of thoRP
facts just stated, do you have an opinion aR
to whether or not you ·would expect the
development of fatal post-operative shock
following such surgical repair?
~fR. NEBEKER: The same obj·ection.
THE COURT: Overruled.
A. No, I would not think that the surgeon would
expect a fatal post-operative result. Of
course, that does occur occasionally, but he
certainly would not expect it normally.
Q. Assume further those facts just stated abm·p
and the additional factR that aftpr making
the incision in the paHent 's abdomen, it was

4
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..:-\.
Q.
~\.

Q.

Q.

.\.
Q.
A.

found that tltirtt•t>u to ~PventPPll adlwsio11s
existed and that the bowel was knuckled but
not totallv obstrneted, do you have an
opinion a~ to wether or n~t fatal postoperative shoek would n·aturally and probably result or be expected from the surgical
repair of such conditions'?
X o, I would not think so.
1 ou mean you do not think you have an
opinion"?
Xo: I would not think that the surgeon would
expect, operating on such a case, that there
would be a fatal surgical\ shock.
X O\Y, assume the facts st:ated above and that
an operation was performed in the customary
manner to repair said hernia by a surgeon
of the experience related, and completed in
six hours time. without mishap and without any signs of shock developing and •that
the patient's condition was good immediately
following the operation, do you have an opinion as to the likelihood of the patient's recovery without fatal pos·t-operative ~surgical
shock'? \Vhat is your opinion on it1
JlR. XEBEKER: The same objection.
THE COURT: Overruled. I think there you
should indicate the time to the doctor.
(By .J1 r. Pugsley) What would be your opinion, immediately following the operation,
upon examination, finding that the postoperative condition was good, as Dr. Mc"'"
Phail, expressed it~
You are bringing in the element of time
there, are yon not'?
'That is right.
I should ~av that the fact that man had been
on the orw~ating table for six hours would

5
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greatly make the liability of shock more of
a certainty. I would not say a certaint:·,
but it would certainly suggest the fact that
he might have a surgical shock. Six hours
is very unusual time to be on the operating
table."
Dr. Young further described the nature of fatal
post-operative shock, (p. 37-38). "Post-operative shock
usually results from severe trauma on the sympathetic
nervous system of the body, also loss of blood, loss of
bodily fluids in the way of perspiration.''
Both doctors, experienced surgeons, testified that
the operation had been extended by reason of the adhesions found after the incision had been made, which adhesions resulted from the earlier operation for repair
of a duondenal ulcer and incidental r,emoval of appendix
at an earlier time. That former operation had been
completed some 13 months previously with apparently
normal results in August of 1944. Dr. McPhail testified
concerning this :
Q. Will you describe the physical condition of
_Mr. Kellogg, as you found it in October of
1945~

A.
Q.

When I examined him in October, 1945, I
found him ~to have what is knO\vn as a postoperative ventral hernia.
You say this was a post-operative hernia.
From what operation had this hernia developed~

A.

Q.

When I operated on him the previous admission, I opera,ted for a perforated duodenal
ulcer, commonly spoken of as ulcer of the
stomach.
That operation was a successful operation,
6
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in 1944, or was it'!
Yl'S, it was successful. l-Ie made the ordinary
recoYery and left the hospital in good shape.
Q. This hernia had developed subsequent to the
time of the opera,tion and his discharge from
the hospital1
A. That's right."
The standard insuring language of the policy reads
as to the double indemnity provisions:

_-\.

··Double Indemnity In Event of Death By Accidental l\Ieans.''
The standard insuring language of the policy
reads as to the double indemnity provisions:
··Double Indemnity in Event of Death By Accidental :J[eans."
"Benefits-Upon receipt of due proof on
forms prescribed by the Company that the death
of the insured occured while the policy and this
benefit are in full force and effect, and before the
anniYersary date on which this policy becomes
fully paid-up, according to its terms, or prior to
the anniYersary date of the policy on which the
age of the insured, at nearest birthday, is sixty
~,ears. which ever event shall first occur, as the
result of drowning or bodily injury, either of
which is effected exclusively and wholly by external, violent and accidental means, of which
there is a visable contusion or wound on the body
(other than in the case of drowning or of internal
injuries, revealed by an autopsy), and that such
death occurred within ninety days after sustaining such injury, the Company, subject to the limitations hereinafter set forth, will pay double
the face amount of the policy, or Four Thousand
Dollars, instead of ~the face amount of the policy."
"Risks Not Covered-This benefit shall not
lw payable if the death of the insured results,
7
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directly or indirectly, from: self-destruction, or
any attempt thereat, whether sane or in~ane:
from the taking of poision or the inhaling of gas
of any kind, whether voluntary, involuntary or
otherwise, from committing an assult or fplon:,:
from a state of war or insurrection; from riding
in, or from being in or upon, a submarine vessel,
or any kind of aircraH except as a fare-paying
passenger while riding inside a licensed passenger aircraft provided by an incorporated passenger carrier while operated by a licensed pilot
over a regular passenger route between r~tab
lished airports located within the borders of the
continental United States of America, excluding
Alaska; from physical or mental infirmity; from
illness or disease of any kind; or from any bacterial infection other than that occuring in consequence of visible injury on the exterior of
the body effected solely through external, violent
and accidental means.''

STATEMENT OF ISSUES
The issues which have been raised are:
I. Did the insured die from accidental means .
resulting from bodily injury ... effected exclusively and
wholly by external, violent and accidental means, of
which there is a visible contusion or wound on the body,
so as to entitle the widow to recover~
II. Was insured's death the result of "physical
or mental infirmity"-; or from "illness or disease of
any kind"; within the exclusion provisions of the policy~

STATEMENT OF ERRORS
That the trial court erred in not finding that the
insured 'f' death resulted from accidental means within
the insuring clause of the poliry.

8
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T'hat the trial court erred in finding that the inSlued's death resulted from •'physical infirmity or illness or disease".
ARGUMENT
The instant case is one wherein the trial court
had before it only the testimony of Dr. McPhail and
Dr. Clark Young on behalf of the plaintiff, widow of
the insured, ·and no conflicting evidence adduced by the
defendant insurance company. Thus a complete review
of the evidence, findings and law by your Honorable
Court is proper.
On behalf of the widow it is strongly asserted that
the law has already been reviewed and decided in favor
of the widow's contention by the case of Maud C. Handley z:. The Jlutual Life Insurance Company of New York,
147 Pac. (2d) 319, 106 Utah 184. Therein the widow
\\·as likewise suing for the double indemnity benefits provided for in thP life insurance policy on her deceased
husband.
The deaths and the policies involved in these two
cases are parallel. Mr. Handley was 53 years of age
and :\Ir. Kellogg 46 years old. Each underwent a surgical operation for reduction of a hernia, and as a result
thereof ~fr. Handley died from a pulmonary embolism
while l\[r. Kellogg died from post-operative shock. The
Handley policy, under which you awarded recovery of
double indemnity benefits to the widow, provided in part
for payment of the benefits upon proof of death "as a
1lirect result of ,bodily injury effected solely through
external. violent, and accidental means, independently
9
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and exclusively of all other causes, and of which . . .
there is evidence by a visible contusion or wound on the
exterior of the body ... ".
The Kellogg policy on which our present action is
predicated and which was prepared and issued by the
defendant insurance company provides for similar benefHs upon proof of death ''as a result of drowning or of
bodily injury, either of which is effected exclusively and
wholly by external, violent and accidental means, of
which there is a visible contusion or wound on the body.''
In the above cited Handley case you made a very
careful and thorough analysis of the law in similar cases.
You noted a divergence in adjudicated cases and after
reviewing these, you held tha't the death from the hernia
operation induced embolism was an ''accidental death''
and properly awarded to the widow the double indemnity
benefits provided for therein.
The parallel of these two cases is such that we
believe 'and respectfully urge that the judgment of your
Court should be for payment to Mrs. l{ellogg of the
accidental benefits provided by this policy.
Let ns
obRerve a few of the further similarities.
As noted above, each policy employs the standard
insurance phraseology, through ''external, violent and
accidental'' means, and each requires the presenee of
a "visible contusion or wound on the body."
In the Handley case the hernia operation was performed using ''standard operative procedure'' and there
were no slips or mishaps. The same evidence applies
to our case - Mr. Kellogg according to Dr. McPhail's
10
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tP~timony was operah'd upon in the customary manner
for the surgical reduction of the hernia involved.
The court, through Justice \Y olfe, in the Handley
case analyzed carefully the material facts and compared
the decisions. He reasoned that there may be some question as to the ··accident'' being determined by the results
but eited cases heretofore decided by our Supreme
Court sneh as, Richards vs. Standard Accident Ins. Co.,
3S Utah G~~. 200 Pac. 1017 where death by a sunstroke
was held to be accidental; and Whatcott vs. Continental
Cas1wlty Co., 85 Utah 406, 39 Pac. (2d) 733 where death
from an intended novocane injection used as anaesthetic
in an appendix operation was held to be an accidental
death. The court further said:
'• This court has definitely gone on record as
eonstruing ,the provision under discussion and
equivalent provisions as reaching cases where the
death or disablement is the unexpected result,
intewle(l acts making the result itself, rather than
the means, the accident. ''
There exists in different state courts rules to ~the
contrary, but Utah has irrevocably gone on record that
an in~nrance company is bound to pay the accidental
death benefits in this type of case where the result of
the intended act (the initial incision of the operation)
is unexpected. The IIandley decision is replete with
expressions as to what is an accident within ~the terms
of these policies, such as, ''an effect which the actor did
11ot intend to produce", etc.
'' \Ye have largely rested the decision of this
case on our own \Vatcott case and that line of
ea~<>s 'Yhich hold as it did. Independently of that

11
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case there is, as has been heretofore intimated,
substantial authority for the proposition that
whether the means are accidental is determined
by the character of their effects. ''Accidental
means are those which prodtt.ce effects which are
not their natural and probable consequences. The
natural consequence of means used is that consequence which ordinarily follows from its use,
the result which may be reasonably anticipated
from its use - and which ought to be expected.
The probable consequence of the use of a given
means is the consequence which is more likely to
follo''T from its use than it is to fail to follow."
(Italics part of quotation.)
In the Handley case ·the emboli were definitely related to the operation by the Doctors. Their causes
lay in the realm of conjecture, bruises of the vein, differences in coagulation of the blood, manipulations in
the operation, or other causes. The operation is designa~ted as the "violent and external injury" within the
· terms of the policy.
The Mutual Life Insurance Company of New York
defended its claimed exemption fr-om liability on the
basis that the "accident" involved was the one causing
the hernia and that had occurred more than 90 days
prior to death and hence was excluded. Your Court
clearly rejected that theory and then the insurance
company jumped to a new defense, conceding the surgical operation supplied the elements of a violent and
external means, but contended tha't it was not an accident
because the deceased freely and voluntarily consented
to it and it was performed as designed and intended and
''the doctor knew that the re~mlt which did oreur might

12
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oecnr without intervention of any fortuitous event. Pulmonary Elinbolism is a Yery common cause of death".
On this defensP your decision was that such consHtutes
an accident within the terms of the policy.
Xo citations are needed to establish that policies of
this nature and particularly the exclusions and exceptions on whieh the insurance company is attempting to
rest, are to be construed most strongly against the insurance company and tha>t the strict understanding of
the expert legal mind is not the standard for construction
of policies in suits by innocent beneficiaries against the
insnranee con1pany who drafted the phraseology of the
poliey.
Apparently the insurance company wants ~to deprive
:Jirs. Kellogg of the benefits of the policy upon some
theory that there were other factors contributing to
:Jfr. Kellogg's death, adhesions and partial bowel ob~tructions arising from an operation completed over
thirteen months prior thereto. That this is not a valid
defen:;:e is realized by comparing the Handley case. In
that one the hernia had developed more than 90 days
before death and it was this hernia that was being repaired. But the court tied its decision into the first
cutting of ::\Ir. Handley, as part of the operation, as the
starting point for determining the accident. Whether
the unreduced hernia of Mr. Handley for an extended
period, or the surgeon's unavoidable handling of the
organs caused the fatal embolism, could not be determined, and was not found to be material. The fatal
result fixed the accident.

13
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Both men had physical infirmities that made advisable surgical reduction. Both men were apparently in
good condition before the operation. Both were in good
condition after the operation. Mr. Handley died from
a fatal embolism developing after the operation; ~Ir.
Kellogg died from fa,tal surgical shock developing after
the operation.
We submit that under the Handley case it is immaterial that the operation 'took some six hours, because of
conditions which appeared or developed subsequent to
the cutting of the incision, or that after the incision was
made it may have appeared that Mr. Kellogg was not a
good surgical risk. The testimony is undisputed that
at the time of the cutting of the incision (which was
the "violent external force") Mr. Kellogg was in good
condition and was considered to be a good surgical risk,
and neither fatal surgical shock nor death from any
means was contemplated or expected, but on the contrary
the development of fatal surgical shock from which he
died, was an unexpected, unforseen event.
Recognizing the conflict in authorities in various
jurisdictions but that Utah has once and for all settled
the position to be taken by our courts, "~e feel that no
other cases need bet cited. A review of ~the Handley case
and the Whatcott case, supra. convinces that the decision
in the matter now before the court should he in favor of
Mrs. Kellogg and against the insurance company.
Since the Handley case, your court decided the
Tucker v. New York Life Insurance Company case, 155
Pac. (2d) 173, 107 Ut. 488. ThP California \Vestern
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~tate~

Life InsurancP Cmnpany, defendant and respondent herein, contended below that said case was controlling· ns relieving the insurance company from liability.
In this Tucker case the deceas,ed fell and broke his arm
on N oven1ber 19th, 1941 and died from a ruptured dis~eeting aneurysm of the aorta on December 7, 1941.
Your Court reviewed the evidence and reversed an award
to the beneficiaries.
In reviewing the evidence you found that the decedent had been suffering from a diseased heart which
progressively deteriorated for a year and finally gave
way by reason of increased blood pressure. You reviewed the rules laid down in the Browning v. Equitable
Life Assu-rance Society, 72:Pac. (2d) 1060, 1073, 94 Utah
532, case which reaffirmed the rule of strictissimi juris in
the construction of insurance policies and declared in
favor of the insured to accomplish the purpose for which
it was taken and for which the premiums were paid.
These three rules were stated as :
(1) "\Yhen an accident causes a diseased
condition which, together with the accident, re~ults in the injury or death complained of, the
accident alone is to be considered as the cause of
the injury or d~ath.''
(2) "vVhen, at the time of the accident, the
insured vYas suffering from some disease, but
the disease had no casual connection with the injtu~' o.r death resulting from the accident, the
accident is to be considered the sole cause."
(3) "vVhen at the time of the accident, there
'trns an existing disease which, cooperating with
the accident resulted in the injury or death,
tlw accident cannot be considered as the sole
cansP, or as the cause independent of all other
causes."

15
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The insurance company would have you believe
that Mr. Kellogg was suffering from "an existing disease'' which caused the death. The trial court in
finding No. 10. declared:
"That the death of said Neal J. Kellogg
resu!ted directly or indirectly from physical infirmity or illness or disease, to-wit: The ruptured ulcer of the stomach caused and made
necessary the surgery in 1944 upon the body of
the said Neal J. Kellogg, and said surgery caused
and made necessary the surgery of 1945, which
in turn caused the death of the said Neal J.
Kellogg.''
Plaintiff took exceptions to said findings of fact
(p. 18) and represents to this Court that the trial court
erred in making said finding. This case is clearly not
analagous to the Tucker case (supra) wherein the diseased condition of the heart caused i t to give way to
high blood pressure which had been developing for
over one year. The Tucker case distinguished its facts
from the decision rendered in 1938 by your Court in
Lee v. New York Life Insurance Co. 82 Pac. (2d) 178,
95 Ut. 445.
In the Lee case it is to be remembered that again a
widow sought to recover double indemnity benefits under
a life insurance policy having substantially the same
language as in the instant case. (It is to be noted that
all of the double indemnity clauses in the adjudicated
cases have remarkably similar wording.)
Mr. Lee on July 12th suffered an accidental blow
to his abdomen; that ruptured an already diseased gall
bladder~ which jn turn eaused an infected appendix,
1
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which nu1de necessary an operation a month after the
aecident where the gall bladder and appendix were removed. He failed to rally from the operation and died
on August 24th. The attending physician testified that
the infected gall bladder, though of long standing, had
become dormant and was made active by the blow which
ruptured it.
Let us now review again the facts in the instant
case before the Court. ~Ir. ICellogg had an emergency
operation for a perforated ulcer in 1944. The operation
was completed and normal recovery had. Subsequently,
on the site of the first operation, a ventral hernia developed causing a bulging of the area and discomfort to
~Ir. ICellogg. It was to repair this that he went to Dr.
~[cPhail and the operation was planned. After a careful
examination, X-rays, metabolism and blood tests, Dr.
:JicPhail determined that Mr. Kellogg was "found to
be physically fit for such an undertaking". He was
taken to the hospital and the operation started. After
the initial incisions had been made the surgeon discovered that a number of adhesions had developed in
the area involved, some of which almost obstructed the
bowel, but did not completely obstruct it. The presence
of the adhesions extended the time of the operation.
After the operation he left the operating room and his
condition was found to be good. Subsequently shock
developed and progressed to a fatal stage the following
day.
The surgeon, Dr. McPhail, testifi.ed that the death
was unexpected and was ''not an ordinary or necessary
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consequence of such an operation.'' No disease was
present. The perforated ulcer had been repaired and
was no longer active within Mr. Kellogg and there was
no recurrence of the perforation. (p. 31 of deposition).
Likewise though partial obstructions of the bowel did
exist, no toxemia was in evidence. (p. 36 of deposition).
Though we feel that your Court has by the Handley
case set out a guide warranting recovery by the widow
of Mr. Kellogg, permit us to call to your attention an
analagous case just decided last year by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals. New York Life Insurance Co.
v. Cooper, 158 Fed. (2d) 257.
The action again was for the double indemnity
benefHs of a life insurance policy. The insured was
suffering from a kidney stone infection and called the
doctor on September 27 at 2 :00 A.M. At 4:00 A.M. four
1;.4 grain injections of morphine sulfate (the approved
and customary treatment) were administered at 30 minute intervals. He suffered intensely and by 10:00 A.M.
he was in shock. At 2:00 P.M. the pulmotor was called
and artificial respiration administered. On September
29th he was admitted to the hospital with pneumonia
symptons from which he subsequently died, suffering
a respiratory collapse.
Recovery of double indemnity benefits were awarded
to the beneficiary because the respiratory collapse of the
insured was the unexpected, unusual and unforeseen result of the morphine injections. (p. 258) "Death then,
was the unexpected result of intended means.''
See similarly, Rinaldi v. Pntde11tial Insurance Co.,
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11S Conn. 419; 172 A. 777. Insured suffered from
chronic myocarditis and angina pectoris. He was struck
in the head by a stick while sawing· and then died from
heart difficulties. p. 780, approves the rule stated in
the case of F-reeman v. Merchantile Mutual Accident
A8s'n., 156 1\fass. 351, 353; 30 N.E. 1013, 1014; 17 L.R.A.
753.
•·An injury which naturally produce death in
a person of a certain temperament or s~tate of
health is the cause of his death if he dies by
reason of it, even if he would not have died if his
temperan1ent or previous health had been different: this is so as well when the injury interrupts the vi tal processes.''
(Cites a large number of cases from various courts.)
":Jlanifestly. recovery is not barred merely
hecause the insured is suffering from disease."
(Cites more cases.)
Thus on behalf of the widow of Neal J. K·ellogg,
we respectfully urge that the decision of the trial court
should be reversed; and that judgment should be directed
for entry in favor of plaintiff and appellant herein. The
premiums were paid for the double indemnity benefits
in good faith and relied upon by the insured for protection and benefits to his widow. The insurance company
is endeavoring to escape payment of this claim by reliance upon special, technically worded, ambiguous
phraseology embodied in the policy. Your Court stated
m the Handley case, p. 322:
"It is to be granted that a contract in case
of ambiguity must be construed against the party
who rlre"· it and especially is this so in the case
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of contracts which are sold widely to the average
man under sales talk which cannot be too technical
in its expositions and yet which very easily lull
him into a belief that he has purchased certain
benefits which upon closer scrutiny of the contract are asserted not to be included . * * * But
we cannot turn back the clock. This court has
definitely gone on record as construing the provisions under discussion and eq'Wivalent provisions as reaching cases where the death or disablement is the unexpected result, intended acts
making the result itself, rather than the means,
the accident." (Italics added.)

Respectfully submitted,

PUGSLEY, HAYES & RAMPTON,
Attorneys for Plaintiff
and Appellant
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